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Abstract. At CRYPTO 2017, Ros¸ca, Sakzad, Stehle´ and Steinfeld in-
troduced the Middle–Product LWE (MPLWE) assumption which is as
secure as Polynomial-LWE for a large class of polynomials, making the
corresponding cryptographic schemes more flexible in choosing the un-
derlying polynomial ring in design while still keeping the equivalent ef-
ficiency. Recently at TCC 2019, Lombardi, Vaikuntanathan and Vuong
introduced a variant of MPLWE assumption and constructed the first
IBE scheme based on MPLWE. Their core technique is to construct lat-
tice trapdoors compatible with MPLWE in the same paradigm of Gentry,
Peikert and Vaikuntanathan at STOC 2008. However, their method can-
not directly offer a Hierachical IBE construction. In this paper, we make
a step further by proposing a novel trapdoor delegation mechanism for
an extended family of polynomials from which we construct, for the first
time, a Hierachical IBE scheme from MPLWE. Our Hierachy IBE scheme
is provably secure in the standard model.
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1 Introduction
Hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) [7, 9] is a variant of IBE [17],
which embeds a directed tree. The nodes of the tree are identities and the chil-
dren identities are produced by appending extra information to their parent
identities. HIBEs can be found in many applications such as forward-secure
encryption [3], broadcast encryption [5,19] and access control to pervasive com-
puting information [8] to name a few most popular.
In lattice-based cryptography, a crucial tool for constructing IBE and HIBE
schemes is a trapdoor. The GPV construction, for instance, applies trapdoor
preimage sampleable functions [6]. The trapdoor plays a role of master secret
key that is used to sample private key for each identity (following a distribution
that is negligibly close to uniform). This trapdoor is applied by Gentry et al. [6]
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to construct their IBE from lattices in the random oracle model. Using the same
paradigm as [6], Agrawal et al. [1] introduced their IBE scheme in the standard
model. Cash et al. [4] define bonsai tree with four basic principles in delegating
a lattice basis (i.e., delegating a trapdoor in the [6] sense). The bonsai tree
technique helps to resolve some open problems in lattice-based cryptography.
It allows us to construct some lattice-based primitives in the standard model
(without random oracles) as well as it facilitates delegation for purposes such
as lattice-based HIBE schemes. At the same time, Agrawal et al. [2] proposed
two distinct trapdoor delegations following the definition of trapdoor from [6].
Their techniques have been used to construct a HIBE scheme in the standard
model, which is more efficient than the one from [4]. Micciancio and Peikert in
their work [13] introduced a simpler and more efficient trapdoor generation and
delegation mechanism.
The middle-product learning with errors problem (MPLWE) is a variant
of the polynomial learning with error problem (PLWE) proposed by Ros¸ca et
al. [16]. It exploits the middle-product of polynomials modulo q. The authors
of [16] have proved that MPLWE is as secure as PLWE for a large class of polyno-
mials. This allows more flexibility in choosing underlying polynomial rings when
designing cryptosystems. In [16], the authors have constructed a Regev-type pub-
lic key encryption scheme based on MPLWE, which is as efficient as that built
over Ring-LWE [12]. Recently, Lombardi et al. [10] have generalized MPLWE
and call it degree-parametrized MPLWE (DMPLWE). They have proved that
DMPLWE is as hard as PLWE using similar arguments as in [16]. Further, the
authors of [10] have introduced a lattice trapdoor construction (following the
trapdoor notion of [13]) for DMPLWE. The construction can be used to design
a dual Regev encryption. The dual encryption allows the authors of [10] to come
up with IBE constructions in both the random oracle model and the standard
model. The standard model IBE in [10] is adapted from the framework of [1].
However, a DMPLWE-based construction for a standard model HIBE cannot be
directly obtained from the standard model IBE of [10]. Thus there is a need for
more work in order to define an appropriate trapdoor delegation mechanism for
the polynomial setting.
Our contribution. In this paper, we follow the line of research initiated by
the work [10]. In particular, we introduce a novel technique for delegating lat-
tice trapdoors from DMPLWE and construct a new HIBE scheme based on
DMPLWE. Our HIBE scheme is provably secure in the standard model. We
follow the framework from [1] and [10].
Let a = (a1, · · · , at′) be a t′-family of polynomials. We can interpret any
polynomial as a structured matrix, e.g. Toeplitz matrix [15], and hence a can be
represented as a concatenated structured matrix, say A. The trapdoor from [10]
is a modification of the trapdoor used in [13] and is defined for a family of
polynomials. More specifically, in [10], a trapdoor for the family a is a collection
tda of short polynomials (here short means small coefficients), from which we
form a matrix R such that A·[R
I
]
= G, whereG is the concatenated structured
matrix of g = (g1, · · · , gγτ ), namely gj = 2ηxdζ for j = ζτ + η + 1 with η ∈
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{0, · · · , τ − 1}, ζ ∈ {0, · · · , γ − 1}. We call g the primitive family. The trapdoor
tda is used to search for a t
′-family of polynomials r := (r1, · · · , rt′) (following
some distribution that is close to uniform) such that 〈a, r〉 := ∑t′i=1 ai · ri = u
for any given polynomial u of appropriate degree.
For a construction of DMPLWE–based HIBE, we need to derive a trapdoor
for an extended family of polynomials, say f = (a|h) = (a1, · · · , at′ |h1, · · · , ht′′),
from a trapdoor for a. To this end, we first proceed with the case t′′ = γτ , i.e.,
the number of polynomials in h has to be the same as the number in g. We
transform h into a matrix H, and then apply the idea of trapdoor delegation
from [13] to obtain the trapdoor tdf for f. We generalize the trapdoor delegation
to the case t′′ = mγτ , a multiple of γτ for m ≥ 1.
Using the proposed polynomial trapdoor delegation, we build the first HIBE
based on DMPLWE, which is provably IND–sID–CPA secure in the standard
model. To produce a private key for an identity id = (id1, · · · , idℓ) at depth
ℓ, we form an extended family f id = (a,h
(1,id1)
, · · · ,h(ℓ,idℓ)) in which each
h
(i,bit)
= (h
(i,bit)
1 , · · · , h(i,bit)t′ ) is a family of random polynomials. Then our trap-
door delegation helps to get a trapdoor for f id, which plays the role of the
private key with respect to the identity id. Deriving a private key for a child
identity id|idℓ+1 = (id1, · · · , idℓ, idℓ+1) from a parent identity id = (id1, · · · , idℓ)
is done in similar way by appending h
(ℓ+1,idℓ+1)
to f id so we get f id|idℓ+1 =
(a,h
(1,id1)
, · · · ,h(ℓ,idℓ),h(ℓ+1,idℓ+1)). Then we use the trapdoor delegation to get
its private key from the private key (trapdoor) of f id. In order for the security
proof to work, we need to put a condition on t′ such that t′ is a multiple of γτ .
Indeed, the condition ensures that the simulator is able to simulate an answer
to a private key query of the adversary. The answer is generated using a trap-
door for some h
(i,idı)
, both of which are not chosen randomly but produced by
a trapdoor generator.
Open problems. Our trapdoor delegation technique is restricted to the rela-
tion of the number of polynomials in the primitive family g and the number
of polynomials in the extended family (i.e., t′′ = mγτ , a multiple of γτ). It
would be interesting and might be useful to find a new trapdoor delegation
method that could be applied for an arbitrary t′′ ≥ 1. Moreover, if we had
another mechanism that would help to find a trapdoor for f
′
id, where f
′
id =
(a, 〈h(1,id1),b〉, · · · , 〈h(ℓ,idℓ),b〉), given a random b and its trapdoor tdb, then
we might be able to apply the HIBE framework of [2] to get a smaller ciphertext
size than that of our work here. One more question is that whether or not there
exists a trapdoor (and delegation) method that does not utilise the Toeplitz
representation but applies directly polynomials, with a relevant definition of
polynomial trapdoor.
Organisation. In Section 2, we review some related background. The trapdoor
delegation mechanism for polynomials in MPLWE setting will be presented in
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Section 3. We will give an MPLWE-based HIBE construction in the standard
model in Section 4. Section 5 concludes this work.
2 Preliminaries
Notations. We denote by R<n[x] the set of polynomials of degree less than
n with coefficients in a commutative ring R. We mainly work with the rings
of polynomials over Z such as Z[x] and Zq[x]. We use italic small letters for
polynomials in R. For a positive integer ℓ, [ℓ] stands for the set {1, 2, · · · , ℓ}.
The Gram-Schmidt orthogonal matrix of a matrix A is written as A˜. We call
h an n-family (or n-vector) of polynomials if h = (h1, · · · , hn), where hi’s are
polynomials. By a|h, we denote a concatenated (or expanded) family, which
consists of all ordered polynomials from both a and h. For two n-families of
polynomials a = (a1, · · · , an) and r = (r1, · · · , cn), their scalar product is defined
as 〈a, r〉 :=∑ni=1 ai · ri. The notation U(X) stands for the uniform distribution
over the set X . The Euclidean and sup norms of a vector u (as well as a matrix)
are written as ‖u‖ and ‖u‖∞, respectively.
2.1 IBE and HIBE: Syntax and Security
Syntax. An IBE system [17] is a tuple of algorithms {Setup, Extract, Encrypt,
Decrypt}, in which: (1) Setup(1n) on input a security parameter 1n, outputs a
master public key MPK and a master secret key MSK; (2) Extract(MSK, id) on
input the master secret key MSK and an identity id, outputs a private key SKid;
(3) Encrypt(MPK, id, µ) on input the master public key MPK, an identity id and
a message µ, outputs a ciphertext CT; and (4) Decrypt(id, SKid,CT) on input
an identity id and its associated private key SKid and a ciphertet CT, outputs a
message µ.
A HIBE [7] is a tuple of algorithms {Setup, Extract, Derive, Encrypt, Decrypt},
where Setup, Extract, Encrypt, Decrypt are defined in similar way as for IBE. Let
λ be the maximum depth of identities. An identity at depth ℓ ≤ λ is represented
by a binary vector id = (id1, · · · , idℓ) ∈ {0, 1}ℓ of dimension ℓ and it is considered
as the “parent” of the appended id|idℓ+1 = (id1, · · · , idℓ, idℓ+1). The algorithm
Setup(1n, 1λ) needs a slight modification as it accepts both n and λ as the input.
For the input: private key SKid and id|idℓ+1, the algorithm Derive(SKid, id|idℓ+1)
outputs the private key SKid|idℓ+1 for the identity id|idℓ+1. If we consider the
master secret key as the private key for any identity at depth 0, then Derive has
the same function as Extract. (H)IBE has to be correct in the following sense:
Pr[Decrypt(id, SKid,Encrypt(MPK, id, µ))] = 1− negl(n),
where the probability is taken over random coin tosses for Setup, Extract, Encrypt,
Decrypt (for IBE) and Derive (for HIBE).
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Security. For the purpose of our paper, we present the following security game
for IND-sID-CPA or indistinguishability of ciphertexts under a selective chosen-
identity and adaptive chosen-plaintext attack. In the game, the adversary has to
announce his target identity at the very beginning. For a security parameter n,
let Mn and Cn be the plaintext and ciphertext spaces, respectively. The game
consists of six phases as follows:
– Initialize: The challenger chooses a maximum depth λ and gives it to the
adversary. The adversary outputs a target identity id∗ = (id∗1, · · · , id∗k), (k ≤
λ).
– Setup: The challenger runs Setup(1n, 1λ) and sends the public parameters
MPK to the adversary. The master secret key MSK is kept secret by the
challenger.
– Queries 1: The adversary makes private key queries adaptively. The queries
are for identities id of the form id = (id1, · · · , idm) for some m ≤ λ, which
are not a prefix of id∗. This is to say that idi 6= id∗i for all i ∈ [m] and m ≤ k.
The challenger answers the private key query for id by calling the private
key extraction algorithm Extract and sends the key to the adversary.
– Challenge:
• Whenever the adversary decides to finish Queries 1, he will output the
challenge plaintext µ∗ ∈Mn.
• The challenger chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}. It computes the challenge
ciphertext CT∗. If b = 0, it calls the encryption algorithm and gets
CT∗ ← Encrypt(MPK, id∗, µ∗). If b = 1, it chooses a random CT ∈ Cn so
CT∗ ← CT . CT∗ is then sent to the adversary.
– Queries 2: The adversary makes the private key queries again and the
challenger answers the queries as in Queries 1.
– Guess: The adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} and he wins if b′ = b.
The adversary in the above game is referred to as an INDr-sID-CPA adversary.
The advantage of an adversary A in the game is AdvHIBE,λ,A(n) = |Pr[b =
b′]− 1/2|.
Definition 1 (IND-sID-CPA). A depth λ HIBE system E is selective-identity
indistinguishable from random if for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
INDr-sID-CPA adversary A, the function AdvHIBE,λ,A(n) is negligible. We say
that E is secure for the depth λ.
2.2 Lattices and Gaussian Distributions
For positive integers n,m, q and a matrix A ∈ Zn×m, We consider lattices
Λ⊥q (A) = {z ∈ Zm : Az = 0 (mod q)} Λuq (A) = {z ∈ Zm : Az = u (mod q). If
Λuq (A) 6= ∅ then Λuq (A) is a shift of Λ⊥q (A). Specifically, if there exists e such
that Ae = u (mod q) then Λuq (A) = Λ
⊥
q (A) + e.
Definition 2 (Gaussian Distribution). Given countable set S ⊂ Rn and
σ > 0, the discrete Gaussian distribution DS,σ,c over S centered at some c ∈
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S with standard deviation σ is defined as DS,σ,c(x) := ρσ,c(x)/ρσ,c(S), where
ρσ,c(x) := exp(
−π‖x−v‖2
σ2 ) and ρσ,c(S) :=
∑
x∈S ρσ,c(x). If c = 0, we simply
write ρσ and DS,σ instead of ρσ,0, DS,0,σ, respectively.
We use of the following tail bound of DΛ,σ for parameter σ sufficiently larger
than the smothing parameter ηǫ(Λ), defined to be the the smallest real number
s such that ρ1/s(Λ
∗ \ {0}) ≤ ǫ; cf. [14].
Lemma 1 ( [6, Lemma 2.9]). For any ǫ > 0, any σ ≥ ηǫ(Z), and any K > 0,
we have Prx←DZ,σ,c [|x − c| ≥ K · σ] ≤ 2e−πK
2 · 1+ǫ1−ǫ . In particular, if ǫ ∈ (0, 12 )
and K ≥ ω(√logn), then the probability that |x− c| ≥ K · σ is negligible in n.
2.3 Degree-Parametrized Middle-Product Learning with Errors
Definition 3 (Middle-Product, [16, Definition 3.1]). Let da, db, k, d be
integers such that da + db − 1 = 2k + d. We define the middle-product of two
polynomials a ∈ Z<da [x] and b ∈ Z<db [x] as follows:
⊙d : Z<da [x]× Z<db [x]→ Z<d[x], (a, b) 7→
⌊
ab mod xk+d
xk
⌋
. (1)
Lemma 2 ( [16, Lemma 3.3]). Let d, k, n > 0. For all r ∈ R<k+1[x], a ∈
R<n[x], s ∈ R<n+d+k−1[x], it holds that r ⊙d (a⊙d+k s) = (r · a)⊙d s.
Definition 4 (DMPLWE, [10, Definition 9]). Let n′ > 0, q ≥ 2, d =
(d1, · · · , dt′) ∈ [n′2 ]t
′
, and let χ be a distribution over Rq. For s ∈ Z<n′−1q [x], we
define the distribution DMPq,n′,d,χ(s) over
∏t′
i=1(Z
n′−di
q [x]× Rdiq [x]) as follows:
– For each i ∈ [t′], sample fi $←− Z<n′−diq [x] and sample ei ← χdi [x] (repre-
sented as a polynomial of degree less than di).
– Output (fi, cti := fi ⊙di s+ ei)i∈[t′].
The degree-parametrized MPLWE (named DMPLWEq,n,d,χ) requires to distinguish
between arbitrarily many samples from DMPq,n′,d,χ(s) and the same number of
samples from
∏t′
i=1 U(Zn
′−di
q [x]× Rdiq [x]).
For S > 0, let F(S,d, n) be the set of monic polynomials f in Z[x] with the
constant coeficient coprime with q, that have degree m ∈ ∩t′i=1[di, n − di] and
satisfy EF(f) < S. For a polynomial f ∈ Z[x] of degree m, EF(f) is the expan-
sion factor ( [11]) of f defined as follows: EF(f) := maxg∈Z<2m−1[x]
‖g mod f‖∞
‖g‖∞
.
Following [16], Lombardi et al. [10] showed that DMPLWE is as hard as PLWE(f)q,χ
(defined below) for any polynomial f of poly(n)-bounded expansion factor.
Definition 5 (PLWE, [18]). Let n > 0, q ≥ 2, f be a polynomial of degree m,
χ be a distribution over R[x]/f . The decision problem PLWE(f)q,χ(s) is to distin-
guish between arbitrarily many samples {(a, a · s+ e) : a $←− Zq[x]/f, e← χ}, and
the same number of samples from U(Zq[x]/f ×Rq[x]/f) over the randomness of
s
$←− Zq[x]/f .
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It is proven that PLWE(f)q,χ(s) is as hard as solving Shortest Vector Problem (SVP)
over ideal lattices in Z[x]/f ; see [18] for more detail.
Theorem 1 (Hardness of DMPLWE, [10, Theorem 2]). Let n′ > 0,
q ≥ 2, d = (d1, · · · , dt′) ∈ [n′2 ]t
′
, and α ∈ (0, 1). Then, there exists a proba-
bilistic polynomial time (PPT) reduction from PLWE
(f)
q,Dα·q
for any polynomial f
in F(S,d, n) to DMPLWEq,n′,d,Dα′·q (s) with α′ = αS
√
n′
2 .
2.4 Lattice Trapdoor Generation for DMPLWE
Definition 6 (G-Trapdoor, [13, Definition 5.2]). Let A ∈ Zn×mq and G ∈
Z
n×m′
q be matrices with m ≥ m′ ≥ n. A matrix R ∈ Z(m−m
′)×m′ is called G-
trapdoor for A with tag H (which is an invertible matrix in Zn×nq ) if A ·
[
R
Im′
]
=
HG.
In particular, it is suggested in [13, Section 4] that G = In⊗
[
1 2 · · · 2k]. We
can choose H = In or such that HG is any (column) permutation of G which is
similar to the usage of G in [10]. In fact, it is defined in [10, Definition 11]) that
A ∈ Zk×(m+kτ) and G := Ik ⊗ [1 2 · · · 2τ−1] ∈ Zk×kτq . However, G is used in
SamplePre (see below) is actually a (column) permutation of Ik ⊗ [1 2 · · · 2τ−1]
from which the authors can extracts polynomial gi in g thanks to the Toeplitz
representation of polynomials (see Equation (6)). We first recall their definition
and some basic properties.
Definition 7 (Toeplitz matrix). Let R be a ring and d, k > 0 be integers. For
any polynomial u ∈ R<n[x], we define the Topelitz matrix Tpn,d(u) for u as a
matrix in R(n+d−1)×d whose the i-th column is the coefficient vector of xi−1 · u
arranged in increasing degree of x with 0 inserted if any.
By Definition 7, it is easy to assert the following Lemma.
Lemma 3. Let u ∈ Z<n[x]. Then,
Tpn,d(u) = [Tpn+d−1,1(u)|Tpn+d−1,1(x · u)| · · · |Tpn+d−1,1(xd−1 · u)].
Lemma 4 ( [10, Lemma 7]). For positive integers k, n, d and polynomials
u ∈ R<k[x], if v ∈ R<n[x], then Tpk,n+d−1(u) · Tpn,d(v) = Tpk+n−1,d(u · v).
Theorem 2 ( [10, Theorem 4]). Let G := Ik ⊗
[
1 2 · · · 2τ−1] ∈ Zk×kτq and
matrices A ∈ Zk×(m+kτ), R ∈ Zm×kτ be such that A · [ R
Ikτ
]
= G. Then, there
exists an efficient algorithm P = (P1,P2) that executes according to the two
following phases:
– offline: P1(A,R, σ) performs some polynomial-time preprocessing on input
(A,R, σ) and outputs a state st.
8 H. Q. Le, D. H. Duong, W. Susilo and J. Pieprzyk
– online: for a given vector u, P2(st,u) samples a vector from DΛ⊥u (A),σ as
long as
σ ≥ ω(
√
log k) ·
√
7(s1(R)2 + 1), (2)
where s1(R) := max‖u‖=1 ‖Ru‖ is the largest singular value of R.
The value s1(R) is upper bounded as explained by the lemma given below.
Lemma 5 ( [10, Lemma 6]). For any matrix R = (Rij) ∈ Rm×n,
s1(R) ≤
√
mn ·max
i,j
|Rij |. (3)
G-Trapdoor for a family of polynomials. We recap the construction of
lattice trapdoors for DMPLWE from [10]. The construction applies two PPT
algorithms TrapGen and SamplePre.Suppose that q = poly(n), d ≤ n, dt/n =
Ω(log n), dγ = n + 2d − 2, τ := ⌈log2 q⌉, β := ⌈ log2(n)2 ⌉ ≪ q/2, and σ satisfies
Equation (7) below. Then, TrapGen and SamplePre work as follows:
TrapGen(1n): On input a security parameter n, do the following:
– Sample a′ = (a1, · · · , at) $←− (Z<nq [x])t, and for all j ∈ [γτ ], sample
w(j) = (w
(j)
1 , · · · , w(j)t )← (Γ d[x])t where Γ = U({−β, · · · , β}).
– For all j ∈ [γτ ], define uj = 〈a′,w(j)〉 and at+j = gj − uj , where
gj = 2
ηxdζ ∈ Zn+d−1q [x], (4)
for j = ζτ + η + 1 with η ∈ {0, · · · , τ − 1}, ζ ∈ {0, · · · , γ − 1}. Set
g := (g1, · · · , gγτ).
– Output a := (a1, · · · , at, at+1, · · · , at+γτ) with its corresponding trap-
door td := (w(1), · · · ,w(γτ)).
The amount of space to store the trapdoor td is O(d(γτ)t) = O(nτt) as
dγ = n+ 2d− 2 ≤ 3n.
SamplePre(a = (a1, · · · , at+γτ), td = (w(1), · · · ,w(γτ)), u, σ): On input a family
a of t+γτ polynomials together with its trapdoor tdǫ generated by TrapGen,
and a polynomial u of degree less than n+ 2d− 2, do the following:
– First, construct (implicitly) matrices A′,A,T,G for a′, a, td, g, respec-
tively:
A′ = [Tpn,2d−1(a1)| · · · |Tpn,2d−1(at)],
A = [Tpn,2d−1(a1)| · · · |Tpn,2d−1(at)|Tpn+d−1,d(at+1)| · · · |Tpn+d−1,d(at+γτ )],
T =

Tpd,d(w
(1)
1 ) · · · Tpd,d(w(γτ)1 )
...
...
Tpd,d(w
(1)
t ) · · · Tpd,d(w(γτ)t )
 ∈ Z(2d−1)t×dγτq , (5)
G = [Tpn+d−1,d(g1)| · · · |Tpn+d−1,d(gγτ )] ∈ Zdγ×dγτq , (6)
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Idγτ =
Tp1,d(1) · · ·· · · · · ·
· · · Tp1,d(1)
 ∈ Zdγτ×dγτq .
Then A = [A′|G −A′T] and hence A · [ TIdγτ ] = G. Recall that dγ =
n+ 2d− 2.
– The polynomial u is represented it as u = Tpn+2d−2,1(u) ∈ Zn+2d−2q .
– Sample vector r ∈ Z(2d−1)t+dγτ from DΛ⊥
u
(A),σ using the trapdoor T in
means of [13], where
σ ≥ ω(
√
log(dγ)) ·
√
7(s1(T)2 + 1), (7)
and
s1(T) ≤
√
(2d− 1)t · (dγτ) · β. (8)
– Split r into r = [r⊤1 | · · · |r⊤t+γτ ]⊤, and rewrite it (in column) as a Toeplitz
matrix of polynomials r1, · · · , rt+γτ , where rj = Tp2d−1,1(rj), deg(rj) <
2d− 1, ∀j ∈ [t], rj = Tpd,1(rj), deg(rt+j) < d,∀j ∈ t+ 1, · · · , t+ γτ .
– Output r := (r1, · · · , rt+γτ ). Note that, 〈a, r〉 =
∑t+γτ
i=1 ai·ri = u; see [10,
Section 5] for more details.
The runtime of SamplePre is O˜(nt) and the output distribution of (ri) is
exactly the conditional distribution
(DZ2d−1,σ[x])
t × (DZd,σ[x])γτ |
t+γτ∑
i=1
ai · ri = u.
Further on, we give our main results, which are a trapdoor delegation mecha-
nism useful for extending a family of polynomials as well as a HIBE system built
using the framework of [1]. From now on, by “trapdoor”, we mean “G-trapdoor”,
where G is defined by Equation (6). Also, we denote the output of TrapGen by
aǫ and tdǫ and call them the root family and the root trapdoor, respectively. The
Toeplitz matrices Aǫ and Tǫ correspond to aǫ and tdǫ, respectively.
3 Trapdoor Delegation for Polynomials
3.1 Description
In order to exploit the trapdoor technique in constructing a MPLWE-based
HIBE scheme, we have to solve the problem of delegating a trapdoor (in the
sense of Definition 6) for f = (a1, · · · , at′ |h1, · · · , ht′′) provided the trapdoor
for a = (a1, · · · , at′). As mentioned in Section 2.4, we can represent f as a
concatenation of Toeplitz matrices of the form F = [A|H] in which A,H are the
Toeplitz representations for a and h := (h1, · · · , ht′′), respectively.
Following Definition 6, our task is to find a matrix R, which satisfies the
equation F · [R
I
]
=G, where G as given by Equation (6). Recall that, in matrix
10 H. Q. Le, D. H. Duong, W. Susilo and J. Pieprzyk
setting in [13, Section 5.5], this task can be easily done by finding R that satisfies
the relation AR = G−H, when we know a trapdoor for A and H has the same
dimension asG. In our setting, this task is not straightforward. The main reason
for this is that the matrices A, G, H are Toeplitz ones. To be able to apply the
idea of trapdoor delegation of [13] to our setting, we have to design H such that
U := G −H is still in the Toeplitz form of some polynomials. In other words,
the form of H should be similar in form and in dimension to that of G in (6),
namely,
H = [Tpn+d−1,d(h1)| · · · |Tpn+d−1,d(hγτ )] ∈ Zdγ×dγτq . (9)
This requires that t′′ = γτ and deg(hi) < n + d − 1 for all i ∈ [γτ ]. If this is
the case, the last step is to try to follow [10] using SamplePre to have R satisfy
AR = U given A and a trapdoor for A. Note that in our polynomial setting R
should be a structured matrix, which can be easily converted into appropriate
polynomials ri.
By generalization, we come up with the following theorem in which t′ =
t+ kγτ and t′′ = mγτ for k ≥ 1,m ≥ 1:
Theorem 3 (Trapdoor Delegation). Let n be a positive integer, q = poly(n)
be a prime, and d, t, γ, τ, k, m be positive integers such that d ≤ n, dt/n =
Ω(log n), dγ = n + 2d − 2, k ≥ 1, m ≥ 1. Let τ := ⌈log2 q⌉ and β := ⌈ log2 n2 ⌉.
Let G be matrix as in (6) and a = (a1, · · · , at+kγτ ) be a (t + kγτ)-family of
polynomials and its associated trapdoor tda, where ai ∈ Z<nq [x] for i ∈ [t] and
ai ∈ Z<n+d−1q [x] for t + 1 ≤ i ≤ t+ kγτ . Suppose that h = (h1, · · · , hmγτ) is a
mγτ-family of polynomials in Z<n+d−1q [x] and σ = (σk+1, · · · , σk+m) to be deter-
mined. Then, there exists an efficient (PPT) algorithm, SampleTrap(a,h, tda, σ)
that outputs a trapdoor tdf for f = (a1, · · · , at+kγτ |h1, · · · , hmγτ). Moreover, the
amount of space to store the trapdoor tdf is O(((2d−1)t+(k+m−1)γτ)·dγτ) =
O(n2 log2 n) = O˜(n2).
3.2 Elementary Trapdoor Delegation
In this section, we present in detail the basic trapdoor delegation for the family
f = (a1, · · · , at+γτ |h1, · · · , hγτ ) given the root trapdoor tdǫ for the root family
aǫ = (a1, · · · , at+γτ ). They are generated by TrapGen, i.e., SampleTrap for k = 1
and m = 1. This process is called TrapDel and is shown as Algorithm 1.
Note that TrapGen, aǫ = (a1, · · · , at, at+1, · · · , at+γτ ) ∈ (Z<nq [x])t×(Z<n+d−1q [x])γτ ,
and the corresponding concatenated Toeplitz matrixAǫ ∈ Z(n+2d−2)×[(2d−1)t+dγτ ]q
is constructed as
Aǫ = [Tp
n,2d−1(a1)| · · · |Tpn,2d−1(at)|Tpn+d−1,d(at+1)| · · · |Tpn+d−1,d(at+γτ )].
(10)
The matrix G has the following form:
G = [Tpn+d−1,d(g1)| · · · |Tpn+d−1,d(gγτ )],
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where gj = 2
ηxdζ for j = ζτ + η+1 with η ∈ {0, · · · , τ − 1}, ζ ∈ {0, · · · , γ − 1}.
As discussed above, we construct H = [Tpn+d−1,d(h1)| · · · |Tpn+d−1,d(hγτ )] for
h1, · · · , hγτ , whose deg(hi) < n+d− 1 for all i ∈ [γτ ]. Then the Toeplitz matrix
for f takes the form
F = [Aǫ|H]
= [Tpn,2d−1(a1)| · · · |Tpn,2d−1(at)|Tpn+d−1,d(at+1)| · · · |Tpn+d−1,d(hγτ )].
(11)
and
G−H = [Tpn+d−1,d(g1 − h1)| · · · |Tpn+d−1,d(gγτ − hγτ)]. (12)
For i = 1, · · · , γτ , let ui = gi − hi. From Lemma 3, we have
G−H =[Tpn+2d−2,1(u1)| · · · |Tpn+2d−2,1(xd−1 · (u1))|
· · · |Tpn+2d−2,1(uγτ )| · · · |Tpn+2d−2,1(xd−1 · (uγτ))]
= [Tpn+2d−2,1(v1)| · · · |Tpn+2d−2,1(xd−1 · (vdγτ ))],
where vi = x
αuβ for i = α + d(β − 1) + 1, with α ∈ {0, · · · , d − 1}, β ∈
{1, · · · , γτ}. Let v(i) := Tpn+2d−2,1(vi). Now, for i = 1, · · · , γτ we have to find
R = [r(1)| · · · |r(dγτ)] such that Aǫ[r(1)| · · · |r(dγτ)] = [v(1)| · · · |v(dγτ)], which is
equivalent toAǫr
(i) = v(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ dγτ . This can be done using SamplePre(aǫ,
tdǫ, vi, σ). Eventually, we get r
(i) ∈ Z(2d−1)t+dγτ , which is sampled fromDΛ⊥
v
(i)
(A),σ,
where σ ≥ ω(√log(dγ)) ·√7((2d− 1)t · (dγτ) · β2 + 1); see (7), (8).
Finally, we obtain the trapdoor tdf = (r
(1), · · · , r(dγτ)) for f, where r(i) =
(r
(i)
1 , · · · , r(i)t+γτ ), with deg(r(i)j ) < 2d − 1 for j ∈ [t], deg(r(i)t+j) < d for j ∈ [γτ ]
and for all i ∈ [dγτ ]. and its corresponding matrix representation is
R = (Rij) =

Tp2d−1,1(r
(1)
1 ) · · · Tp2d−1,1(r(dγτ)1 )
...
...
Tp2d−1,1(r
(1)
t ) · · · Tp2d−1,1(r(dγτ)t )
Tpd,1(r
(1)
t+1) · · · Tpd,1(r(dγτ)t+1 )
...
...
Tpd,1(r
(1)
t+γτ ) · · · Tpd,1(r(dγτ)t+γτ )

∈ Z((2d−1)t+dγτ)×dγτ . (13)
Certainly, we have F · [R
I
]
= G. Remark that, by Lemma 1,
|Rij | ≤ ω(logn) · σ with probability 1− negl(n). (14)
Hence, from Lemma 5
s1(R) ≤
√
((2d− 1)t+ dγτ) · (dγτ) · ω(logn) · σ, (15)
where σ satisfies Equation (7).
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Algorithm 1 TrapDel(a,h, td, σ)
Input: A (t + kγτ )-family of polynomials a = (a1, · · · , at, at+1, · · · , at+kγτ ) ∈
(Z<nq [x])
t × (Z<n+d−1q [x])
kγτ , and its trapdoor tda, and a γτ -family of polyno-
mials h = (h1, · · · , hγτ ) ∈ (Z
<n+d−1
q [x])
γτ , and (implicitly) g = (g1, · · · , gγτ ) ∈
(Z<n+d−1q [x])
γτ as in (4).
Output: The trapdoor tdf for f = (a1, · · · , at+kγτ , h1, · · · , hγτ ).
1: Compute u = (u1, · · · , uγτ )← g− h = (g1 − h1, · · · , gγτ − hγτ ).
2: Define vi = x
αuβ for i = α+d(β−1)+1, with α ∈ {0, · · · , d−1}, β ∈ {1, · · · , γτ}.
3: For i ∈ [dγτ ], call GenSamplePre(a, tda, vi, σ) to get r
(i) = (r
(i)
1 , · · · , r
(i)
t+kγτ ), where
deg(r
(i)
j ) < 2d− 1 for j ∈ [t], deg(r
(i)
t+j) < d for j ∈ [kγτ ] and for all i ∈ [dγτ ].
4: Return tdf = (r
(1), · · · , r(dγτ)).
Note that, after having the trapdoor for f and by assigning aǫ ← f , Aǫ ← F,
we can perform the same procedure explained above. So we get a trapdoor for
f
′
= (a1, · · · , at+γτ , h1, · · · , hγτ |z1, · · · , zγτ) for some z = (z1, · · · , zγτ), where
zi ∈ Z<n+d−1q [x]. Consequently, we come up with a PPT algorithm called TrapDel
(Algorithm 1) in which we consider the expanded families of the form a =
(a1, · · · , at, at+1, · · · , at+kγτ ) ∈ (Z<nq [x])t × (Z<n+d−1q [x])kγτ for k ≥ 1. Also
note that TrapDel does not call SamplePre. Instead, it calls a slightly modified
variant presented below.
Generalized SamplePre. Accordingly to the expansion of trapdoors, we
slightly modify SamplePre in Section 2.4 and call it GenSamplePre. The algorithm
works not only with TrapGen (i.e., k = 1) but also with TrapDel (i.e., k > 1).
GenSamplePre is the same as SamplePre except for k > 1, where matrices R
given as the input trapdoors are of form (13), while for k = 1, the matrix R is
of form (5). If we execute GenSamplePre for input (a = (a1, · · · , at+kγτ ), tda =
(r(1), · · · , r(dγτ)), u, σ), where r(i) = (r(i)1 , · · · , r(i)kγτ ) (with k > 1), then tda
should be interpreted as a ((2d− 1)t+ (k − 1)dγτ)× dγτ -matrix, say R(k−1),
of the form (13). The last row is indexed by t+ (k − 1)γτ .
3.3 SampleTrap
SampleTrap mentioned in Theorem 3 is described as follows:
SampleTrap(a = (a1, · · · , at+kγτ ),h = (h1, · · · , hmγτ ), tda, σ = (σk+1, · · · , σk+m)):
– Input: A (t+kγτ)-family of polynomials a = (a1, · · · , at, at+1, · · · , at+kγτ ) ∈
(Z<nq [x])
t × (Z<n+d−1q [x])kγτ , its trapdoor tda and a mγτ -family of polyno-
mials h = (h0, · · · , hmγτ ) ∈ (Z<n+d−1q [x])mγτ , wherem ≥ 1, and (implicitly)
g = (g1, · · · , gγτ ) ∈ (Z<n+d−1q [x])γτ as in (4).
– Output: The trapdoor tdf for f = (a1, · · · , at+kγτ |h1, · · · , hmγτ).
– Execution:
1. Split h = (h
(1)
, · · · ,h(m)) where each h(i) is a γτ -family of polynomials.
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2. td(1) ← tda, a(1) ← a.
3. For i = 1 up to m do:
• td(i+1) ← TrapDel(a(i),h(i), td(i), σi).
• a(i+1) ← (a(i),h(i)).
4. Return tdf = td
(m+1).
Let us make few observations for SampleTrap.
Trapdoor tdf . From Section 3.2, we can easily generalize to see that the output
tdf is (r
(1), · · · , r(dγτ)) in which for i ∈ [dγτ ], r(i) = (r(i)1 , · · · , r(i)t+(k+m−1)γτ ) and
r
(i)
j ∈ Z<n+d−1q [x] for j ∈ [t], and r(i)t+j ∈ Z<dq [x] for j ∈ [(k + m − 1)γτ ]. We
can imply that the matrix representation, named R(k+m−1), for the trapdoor
tdf has the form (13), with the last row’s index t+ (k +m− 1)γτ .
Setting Gaussian parameters σ = (σ1, · · · , σm). Note that the algorithm
SamplePre(a, tda, u, σ) has to satisfy Condition (7) for each σi. The same con-
dition must hold for GenSamplePre. From Equation (13), we can see that the
trapdoor td(i+1) in SampleTrap can be interpreted as a matrix R(i+1) of dimen-
sion ((2d − 1)t + (k + i − 1)dγτ) × (dγτ). Thus, σi in Equations (14) and (15)
should satisfy σi ≥ ω(
√
log(dγ)) ·
√
7(s1(R(i−1))2 + 1), and
s1(R
(i−1)) ≤
√
((2d− 1)t+ (k + i− 1)dγτ) · (dγτ)·ω(logn)·σi−1, where i ∈ [m].
4 DMPLWE-based HIBE in Standard Model
In this section, we describe a HIBE system based on the DMPLWE problem.
Our HIBE scheme is IND-sID-CPA secure in the standard model and is inspired
by the construction of IBE from [1]. Note that the authors of [10] use a similar
approach. However, the private key SKid (with respect to an identity id) in the
standard model IBE of [10] is actually not a trapdoor. Therefore, it seems difficult
to construct HIBE using this approach. In our HIBE construction, the private
key for an identity id = (id1, · · · , idℓ) of depth ℓ is a trapdoor for a family of
polynomials, which corresponds to the public key. So we can derive the private
key for the appended identity id|idk = (id1, · · · , idℓ, · · · idk) using the trapdoor
delegation presented in Section 3, where k > ℓ.
4.1 Construction
Our construction, named HIBE, consists of a tuple of algorithms {Setup, Extract,
Derive, Encrypt, Decrypt}. They are described below.
Setup(1λ, 1n): On input the security parameter n, the maximum depth λ, per-
form the following:
14 H. Q. Le, D. H. Duong, W. Susilo and J. Pieprzyk
– Set common parameters as follows:
• q = q(n) be a prime; d, k be positive integers such that 2d + k ≤ n
and n+2d−2d is also a positive integer, say γ, i.e., dγ = n + 2d − 2;
β := ⌈ log2 n2 ⌉ , τ := ⌈log2 q⌉, t is a positive integer and let t′ = t+γτ ,
and plaintext space M := {0, 1}<k+2[x].. Note that we will set t′ =
mγτ (with m ≥ 2), that is t is a multiple of γτ so as to we can apply
the trapdoor delegation.
• For Gaussian parameters used in Encrypt: choose α = (α1, · · · , αλ) ∈
R
λ
>0; for Gaussian parameters used in Extract and Derive: chooseΣ =
(σ(1), · · · , σ(λ)), where σ(ℓ) = (σ(ℓ)1 , · · · , σ(ℓ)m ) ∈ Rm>0. For ℓ ∈ [λ], let
Σ
(ℓ)
= (σ(1), · · · , σ(ℓ)); for Gaussian parameters used in Decrypt:
choose Ψ = (Ψ1, · · · , Ψλ) ∈ Rλ>0.
They all are set as in Section 4.2.
– For ℓ ∈ [λ], let χℓ := ⌊Dαℓ·q⌉ be the rounded Gaussian distribution.
– Use TrapGen(1n) to get a root family aǫ = (a1, · · · , at′) and its associated
root trapdoor tdǫ.
– Select uniformly a random polynomial u0 ∈ Z<n+2d−2q [x].
– For each i ∈ [λ], and each bit ∈ {0, 1}, sample randomly h(i,bit) =
(h
(i,bit)
1 , · · · , h(i,bit)t′ ), where each h(i,bit)j ∈ Z<nq [x] for j ∈ [t], and each
h
(i,bit)
j ∈ Z<n+d−1q [x] for j ∈ {t+1, · · · , t+γτ}. Let HList = {(i, bit,h
(i,bit)
) :
i ∈ [λ], bit ∈ {0, 1}} be the ordered set of all h(i,bit).
– Set the master secret key MSK := tdǫ.
We denote id = (id1, · · · , idℓ) ∈ {0, 1}ℓ as an identity of depth ℓ ≤ λ. All
following algorithms will always work on aǫ = (a1, · · · , at′) and HList.
Derive(id|idℓ+1, SKid) : On input id = (id1, · · · , idℓ), id|idℓ+1 = (id1, · · · , idℓ, idℓ+1),
private key SKid := tdid– the trapdoor for f id = (aǫ,h
(1,id1)
, · · · ,h(ℓ,idℓ)), ex-
ecute:
1. Output SKid|idℓ+1 ← SampleTrap(f id,h
(ℓ+1,idℓ+1)
, SKid, Σ
(ℓ+1)
).
Extract(id,MSK): On input id = (id1, · · · , idℓ), MSK = tdǫ, execute:
1. Build hid = (h
(1,id1)
, · · · ,h(ℓ,idℓ)).
2. Output SKid ← SampleTrap(aǫ,hid,MSK, Σ(ℓ)).
Encrypt(id, µ, u0, αℓ): On input id = (id1, · · · , idℓ), µ ∈M, u0, αℓ, execute:
1. Build (f1, · · · , ft′(ℓ+1))← f id = (aǫ,h(1,id1) · · · ,h(ℓ,idℓ)).
2. Sample s
$←− Z<n+2d+k−1q [x].
3. Sample e0 ← χk+1ℓ [x], compute: CT0 = u0 ⊙k+2 s+ 2e0 + µ.
4. For i = 0 to ℓ do:
– For j ∈ [t], sample ei·t′+j ← χ2d+kℓ [x], and compute:
cti = fi·t′+j ⊙2d+k s+ 2ei·t′+j .
– For t+ 1 ≤ j ≤ t+ γτ , sample ei·t′+j ← χd+k+1ℓ [x], and compute:
cti = fi·t′+j ⊙d+k+1 s+ 2ei·t′+j .
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5. Set CT1 = (ct1, · · · , ctt′(ℓ+1)), and output ciphertext CT = (CT0,CT1).
Decrypt(id, SKid,CT, u0, Ψℓ): On input id = (id1, · · · , idℓ), SKid := tdid–the
trapdoor for f id = (aǫ,h
(1,id1)
, · · · ,h(ℓ,idℓ)), ciphertext CT = (CT0,CT1),
u0, and Ψℓ, do:
1. Parse (f1, · · · , ft′(ℓ+1)) ← f id = (aǫ,h(1,id1), · · · ,h(ℓ,idℓ)).
2. Sample r = (r1, · · · , rt′(ℓ+1))← GenSamplePre(fid, SKid, u0, Ψℓ),
i.e., 〈fid, r〉 =
∑t′(ℓ+1)
1 ri · fi = u0.
3. Parse (CT0,CT1 = (ct1, · · · , ctt′(ℓ+1)))← CT.
4. Output µ = (CT0 −
∑t′(ℓ+1)
i=1 cti ⊙k+2 ri mod q) mod 2.
4.2 Correctness and Parameters
Lemma 6 (Correctness). For ℓ ∈ [λ], if
αℓ <
1
4
[
t′(ℓ+ 1) · (k + 1) · ω(logn) · Ψℓ + ω(
√
logn)
]−1
, (16)
then the scheme is correct with probability 1− negl(n).
Proof. For id = (id1, · · · , idℓ), we need to show that
Decrypt(id, SKid,Encrypt(id, µ, u0, αℓ), u0, Ψℓ) = µ,
with probability 1 − negl(n) over the randomness of Setup, Derive, Extract, En-
crypt. Suppose that CT := (CT0,CT1 = (ct1, · · · , ctt′(ℓ+1)))← Encrypt(id, µ, u0, αℓ).
By Lemma 2, we have
CT0 −
∑t′(ℓ+1)
i=1 cti ⊙k+2 ri = µ+ 2(e0 −
∑t′(ℓ+1)
1 ri ⊙k+2 ei).
Hence, if ‖µ+ 2(e0 −
∑t′(ℓ+1)
1 ri ⊙k+2 ei)‖∞ < q/2 then µ is recovered.
Therefore, we need to bound the coefficients of e0−
∑t′(ℓ+1)
1 ri⊙k+2 ei. First,
note that,
– for i ∈ [t]: deg(ri) < dr := 2d− 1, deg(ei) < de := k + 1.
– for i ∈ {t+ 1, · · · , t′(ℓ + 1)}: deg(ri) < dr := d, deg(ei) < de := d+ k + 1.
In gerneral, de + dr − 1 = 2(d − 1) + (k + 2). Let ri = (ri,0, · · · , ri,dr−1), ei =
(ei,0, · · · , ei,de−1) be the vectors of coefficients of ri and ei, respectively. By
definition of the middle product, ri ⊙k+2 ei =
∑d+k
j+w=d−1 ri,j · ei,w · xj+w . By
Lemma 1, Pr[‖ri‖∞ > ω(
√
logn) ·Ψℓ] = negl(n), Pr[‖ei‖∞ > ω(
√
logn) ·αℓ ·q] =
negl(n).
Hence ‖ri ⊙k+2 ei‖∞ < (k + 2) · ω(logn) · Ψℓ · αℓ · q. As a result,∥∥∥∥∥∥e0 −
t′(ℓ+1)∑
1
ri ⊙k+2 ei
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ [t′(ℓ+1) · (k+ 2) · ω(logn) · Ψℓ +ω(
√
logn)] · αℓ · q.
In order for the decryption to be correct, we need Condition (16). ⊓⊔
16 H. Q. Le, D. H. Duong, W. Susilo and J. Pieprzyk
Setting Parameters. We set the parameters as described below:
– Security prameter n, q = poly(n) prime, β := ⌈ log2(n)2 ⌉ ≪ q/2, τ := ⌈log2(q)⌉,
τ = Θ(log q) = Θ(log n), t′ = t + γτ = mγτ (for some m ≥ 2), d ≤ n,
dt/n = Ω(log n), and dγ = n+ 2d− 2 ≤ 3n.
– We set Gaussian parameters used in Extract and Derive as follows: Recall
that, for ℓ ∈ [λ], Σ(ℓ) = (σ(1), · · · , σ(ℓ)), where each σ(i) = (σ(i)1 , · · · , σ(i)m ) ∈
R
m
>0. It suffices to consider the maximal case happening in Extract in which
Σ = (σ(1), · · · , σ(λ)). Now, we renumber Σ as (σ1, · · · , σmλ) without chang-
ing their order. For the maximal identity id = (id1, · · · , idλ), we build
hid = (h
(1,id1)
, · · · ,h(λ,idλ)) and then compute SKid by calling SampleTrap for
input (aǫ,hid,MSK, Σ). We now split hid into (h
(1)
, · · · ,h(mλ)) and let a(i) =
(aǫ|h(1)| · · · |h(i)) with a(0) = aǫ. Then, SampleTrap calls TrapDel(a(i−1),h(i),
td(i−1), σi) up to mλ times for i ∈ [mλ], in which td(0) = tdǫ and td(i−1) is
the output of the previous execution of TrapDel(a(i−2),h
(i−1)
, td(i−2), σi−1),
for 2 ≤ i ≤ mλ. Now, all σi’s are set in the same way as in Section 3.3, that
is, for 2 ≤ i ≤ mλ , σi ≥ ω(
√
log(dγ)) ·
√
7(s1(R(i−1))2 + 1), and
s1(R
(i−1)) ≤
√
((2d− 1)t+ (i − 1)dγτ) · (dγτ) · ω(logn) · σi−1,
in whichR(i−1) is the matrix representation, as in (13) with the last row’s in-
dex t+(i−1)γτ , of the private key (the trapdoor) for a(i−1) = (aǫ|h(1)| · · · |h(i−1)),
with σ1 and R
(1) play the role of σ and T in (7), (8).
– We set Gaussian parameters used in Decrypt Ψ = (Ψ1, · · · , Ψλ) as follows: For
ℓ ∈ [λ], since Ψℓ is used in GenSamplePre(fid, SKid, u0, Ψℓ) with SKid = tdid
the trapdoor for f id = (aǫ,h
(1,id1)
, · · · ,h(ℓ,idℓ)) which equals to a(ℓm) above.
Therefore, for ℓ ∈ [λ− 1] we can set Ψℓ = σℓm+1, and
Ψλ ≥ ω(
√
log(dγ)) ·
√
7(s1(R(mλ))2 + 1),
s1(R
(mλ)) ≤
√
((2d− 1)t+ (mλ)dγτ) · (dγτ) · ω(logn) · σmλ,
in which R(mλ) is the matrix representation for the private key (the trap-
door) for a(mλ) = (aǫ|h(1)| · · · |h(mλ)).
– We set Gaussian parameters used in Encrypt α = (α1, · · · , αλ) such that for
ℓ ∈ [λ], αℓ satisfies (16).
4.3 Security Analysis
Theorem 4. The proposed HIBE system is IND-sID-CPA secure in the standard
model under the DMPLWE assumption.
Proof. We construct a sequence of games fromG0 toG4 in which an INDr–sID–CPA
adversary can distinguish two consecutive games Gi and Gi+1 with negligible
probability only. In particular, for the transition of the last two games G3 and
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G4, we show by contradiction that if there exists an adversary whose views
are different in each game, i.e., the adversary can distinguish G3 from G4 with
non-negligible probability, then we can build an adversary who can solve the
underlying DMPLWE problem.
Game G0 is the original IND–sID–CPA game between the adversary A and the
challenger C. Note that, we are working with the selective game: at the begin-
ning, A lets the challenger know the target identity id∗ = (id∗1, · · · , id∗θ) that
A intends to atack, where θ ≤ λ. Then, C runs Setup to choose randomly a
vector of polynomials aǫ = (a1, · · · , at′) together with an associated trapdoor
tdǫ, a set of polynomial vectors sampled randomly h
(i,bit)
= (h
(i,bit)
1 , · · · , h(i,bit)t′ ),
which are stored in HList0, where each h
(i,bit)
j ∈ Z<nq [x] for j ∈ [t], and each
h
(i,bit)
j ∈ Z<n+d−1q [x] for j ∈ {t + 1, · · · , t + γτ}, and C also chooses a random
polynomial u0 ∈ Z<n+2d−2q [x]. The challenger then sets MSK := tdǫ as the mas-
ter secret key. Furthermore, at the Challenge Phase, the challenger also generates
a challenge ciphertext CT
∗
for the identity id∗.
Game G1 is the same as G0 except that in the Setup Phase the challenger
C generates (h(i,bit))0≤i≤λ,bit∈{0,1} stored in HList1 := {(i, bit,h(i,bit)) : i ∈
[λ], bit ∈ {0, 1}} with the corresponding trapdoor td(i,bit) stored in TList1 :=
{(i, bit, td(i,bit)) : i ∈ [λ], bit ∈ {0, 1}} using TrapGen.
Game G2 is the same as G1, except that the challenger C does not use tdǫ as the
master secret key nor the Extract algorithm to response a private key queries on
id = (id1, · · · , idℓ) which is not a prefix of the target id∗, where ℓ ≤ λ. Instead, C
designs a new procedure TrapExtract with the knowledge of TList1. TrapExtract
requires not all of TList1 but only one td(j,idj) ∈ TList1 for any j ∈ [ℓ].
TrapExtract(aǫ,HList1,id = (id1, · · · , idℓ), j,td(j,idj)):
1. Build f id = (aǫ,h
(1,id1)
, · · · ,h(j−1,idj−1),h(j+1,idj+1), · · · ,h(ℓ,idℓ))
2. SKid ← SampleTrap(h(j,idj), f id, td(j,idj), Σ(ℓ))
Game G3 is the same as G2, except that in the Setup Phase, the challenger C
generates HList3 as follows:
– For each j ∈ [λ] and bit ∈ {0, 1} such that bit 6= id∗j , C calls TrapGen to
generate h
(j,bit)
and its associated trapdoor td(j,bit).
– For each j ∈ [λ] and bit ∈ {0, 1} such that bit = id∗j , C simply samples h
(j,bit)
uniformly at random and set td(j,bit) = ⊥.
The challenger then put all h
(j,bit)
into HList3 and all td(j,bit) into TList3. At the
moment, to response a private key query on identity id = (id1, · · · , idℓ) which is
not a prefix of the target identity id∗, the challenger chooses an index j† such that
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idj† 6= id∗j† . It then runs TrapExtract(aǫ,HList3,id = (id1, · · · , idℓ), j†,td(j
†,id
j†
)),
where td(j
†,id
j†
) ∈ TList3, and gives the result SKid to the adversary. At the
Challenge Phase, the challenge ciphertext CT
∗
is generated by computing En-
crypt(id, µ, u0, α) over HList3.
Game G4 is the same as G3, except that the challenge ciphertext CT
∗
=
(CT∗0,CT
∗
1) is chosen uniformly at random by the challenger.
In what follows, we show the indistinguishability of the games. It is easy to
see that the view of the adversary is identical in games G0 and G1, in games G1
and G2, in games G2 and G3, except in games G3 and G4. We show that the
view of the adversary is indistinguishable in these two games. We proceed by
contradiction. Assume that the adversary A can distinguish between games G3
and G4 with non-negligile probability. Then we construct an adversary B that is
able to solve DMPLWE problem with the same probability. The reduction from
DMPLWE is as follows:
– Instance: Assume that the goal of B is to decide whether 1+t′(ℓ+1) samples
(fz, ctz) for z ∈ {0, · · · , t′(ℓ + 1)} (i) follow
∏t′(ℓ+1)
z=0 U(Zn
′−dz
q [x] × Rdz[x]q ),
or (ii) follow DMPq,n′,d,χ(s), where n
′ = n+ 2d+ k and
• d = (d0, d1, · · · , dt′(ℓ+1)) is interpreted as follows: d0 := k + 2 and for
i ∈ {0, · · · , ℓ}, di·t′+j =
{
2d+ k, if j ∈ [t],
d+ k + 1, if j ∈ {t+ 1, · · · , t+ γτ}.
• fz are random in Z<n′−dzq [x] for z ∈ {0, · · · , t′(ℓ + 1)}.
In other words, B has to distinguish whether (i) all ctz are random or (ii)
ctz = fz ⊙dz s + 2ez in Z<dzq [x], for some s $←− Z<n
′−1
q [x] and ez ← χdz [x],
for all z ∈ {0, · · · , t′(ℓ+ 1)}.
– Targeting: B receives from the adversary A the target identity id∗ that A
wants to attack.
– Setup:. B generates HListB in the same way as in Game G3 and Game G4
as follows:
• For each j ∈ [λ] and bit ∈ {0, 1} such that bit 6= id∗j : B calls TrapGen to
generate h
(j,bit)
and its associated trapdoor td(j,bit).
• For each j ∈ [λ] and bit ∈ {0, 1} such that bit = id∗j : B simply samples
h
(j,bit)
uniformly at random and set td(j,bit) = ⊥.
The challenger then put all h
(j,bit)
into HListB and all td(j,bit) into TListB.
– Queries: To response the private key queries, B acts as in Game G3 or in
Game G4 using one of trapdoors that is not ⊥.
– Challenge: To produce the challenge ciphertext, B chooses randomly b $←−
{0, 1} and sets CT∗ := (CT∗0 := ct0 + µ,CT∗1 := (ct1, · · · , ctt′(ℓ+1))).
– Guess: Eventually,A has to guess and output the value of b. Then, B returns
what A outputted.
Analysis. Clearly, from the view of A, the behaviour of B is almost identical
in both Games G3 and G4. The only different thing is producing the challenge
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ciphertext. Specifically, if ctz’s are DMPLWE samples then the components of
CT
∗
are distributed as in Game G3, while ctz ’s are random then the components
of CT
∗
are distributed as in Game G4. Since A can distinguish between Games
G3 and G4 with non-negligile probability, then so can B in solving DMPLWE
with the same probability. ⊓⊔
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we present a trapdoor delegation method that enables us to obtain
a trapdoor for an expanded set of polynomials from a given trapdoor for a
subset of the set. Also, thanks to the polynomial trapdoor delegation, we built
a hierarchical identity–based encryption system that is secure in the standard
model under the DMPLWE assumption.
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